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OBLIGATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SHIPS
ENCOUNTERING PERSONS IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE AT
SEA
Martin Daviest
Abstract: While there are multiple obligations to rescue individuals lost at sea,
mostly expressed in multilateral treaties, there are limited mechanisms for enforcing
those laws. Enforcement needs to be accomplished through criminal law, as the civil
lawsuit is a poor mechanism. The United States and Australia provide adequate
examples of the implementation, or lack thereof, of international treaties into criminal
law. However, even where the various treaties have been incorporated into the law of the
nation by implementing legislation, the enforcement remains ineffective. This is partially
because the onus of enforcement falls primarily on the flag state of the ship in question,
and many such states are unable or unwilling to use their criminal law to prosecute those
who violate the obligation to assist at sea. Although there are ways for other countries to
enforce the law of the sea upon a ship flying a foreign flag, such mechanisms are limited
in application, unlikely to be utilized, and can be less effective than those of the flag
state.
Weighing against enforcement are strong commercial disincentives to rescue those
lost at sea. In addition to the out-of-pocket costs incurred by ship's owners, the operator
can also lose significant profit for the hours or days the ship is in port or indisposed as a
result of the rescue. It is likely that the latter costs will not be covered by insurance. As a
consequence of these competing interests, it is probable that even if ports of call were to
allow immediate offloading of refugees, it would fail to solve the problem, as the
commercial disincentives still outweigh nonexistent criminal sanctions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the contributions to this Symposium are concerned with what
happened after the container ship MN Tampa rescued the passengers of an
Indonesian ferry in danger of sinking in the Indian Ocean. The "Tampa
incident" arose because of Australia's response to the desire of the rescued
passengers to seek refugee status there. Australia refused to allow the
Tampa to put the rescued passengers ashore, passed retroactive border
control legislation, and ultimately came up with the so-called "Pacific
Solution" for claims to refugee status to be processed in Nauru and Papua
New Guinea in return for Australian aid money.t This Article is not
t Professor of Maritime Law, Admiralty Law Institute and Co-Director, Maritime Law Center,
Tulane Law School. The author would like to thank Candice Washington of the Tulane Law School, Class
of 2004, for her research assistance in preparing this article for publication, and Jessica Tauman, Editor-in-
Chief of the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, who provided me with much useful information for the
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principally concerned with Australia's much-criticized response to the
situation after the rescue, ut wit. the legal issues surounding the rescue
itself.
By rescuing the passengers of the sinking ferry, the master and crew
of the Tampa obeyed both the moral obligation to save human life and the
ancient maritime practice of providing assistance to fellow seafarers. There
are also legal obligations to provide assistance to those in distress at sea, but
this Article will show that they are poorly enforced and unlikely to provide a
strong stimulus to action. Part II describes the international sources of the
obligation of a shipmaster to provide assistance. Part III demonstrates that
in almost all cases, that obligation can only be given legal force by the flag
state-that is, the country in which the ship is registered. However, many
ocean-going commercial ships are registered under flags of convenience 2 in
countries that are notoriously unlikely to be zealous in enforcing the legal
obligations imposed by the conventions.3
Set against these rather weak legal incentives to action are powerful
commercial disincentives. Modem commercial ships have relatively small
crews and therefore little accommodation space, and they carry very little
extra food and water. As a result, any ship picking up a large number of
persons at sea will very quickly be forced to seek out a port of refuge.4 If
Australia's Tampa Incident: The Convergence of International and Domestic Refugee and Maritime Law in
the Pacific Rim symposium presentation.
1 See Emily C. Peyser, Comment, "Pacific Solution "? The Sinking Right to Seek Asylum in
Australia, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 431 (2002); Jessica E. Tauman, Comment, Rescued at Sea, but
Nowhere to Go: The Cloudy Legal Waters of the Tampa Crisis, II PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 461 (2002).
2 In 2001, 27.54% of all merchant ships in the world (9747 of a global total of 30,538) were
registered under one of the seven major flags of convenience, which are (in descending order of tonnage
registered): Panama, Liberia, The Bahamas, Malta, Cyprus, Bermuda, and Vanuatu. U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2001, ch. II, tbls. 16, 17. The proportion of larger
ocean-going vessels under flags of convenience is much higher. When deadweight tonnage (i.e., the ship's
carrying capacity) is used as the measure, the seven main flags of convenience account for 49.54% of the
world's merchant fleet (371,315,000 metric tonnes of a global total of 749,599,346). Id. For a historical
account of the development of the flag of convenience system, see BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF
CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY (1962); RODNEY CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE:
THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PANAMANIAN AND LIERIAN FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE (1981); H.
Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics and
Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139 (1996).
3 Bernard H. Oxman & Mary Coombs, International Decision: State v. Slepansky, 761 So.2d 1027
(Fla.), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 385 (2000) Supreme Court of Florida, Apr. 20, 2000, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 438,
442 (2001) ("In theory, the state with the most natural jurisdiction to act against shipboard crimes is the
flag state. In practice, no one expects Liberia, as part of its 'flag of convenience' service for United States-
based cruise ships and their corporate owners, to extradite, try, and punish those who commit crimes on
board such ships."); ERASTUS C. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, §1 12b[6] (Frank L. Wiswall ed.,
7th rev. ed. 2002). See further infra, notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
4 The Tampa, with a crew of 27, picked up 438 people, who were then housed in empty containers
on the ship's deck. Michael White, M/V Tampa Incident and Australia's Obligations August 2001, 122
MAR. STUD. 7, 7 (2002).
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that port is not on the ship's intended itinerary, the deviation may prove
costly because of the delay in completing the ship's voyage and delivering
its cargoes, as Part IV will show. Part IV will also show that the standard
insurance coverage carried by commercial ships does not indemnify the
ship's operator against the substantial portion of the cost of such a delay. As
a result, the ship's operator is left to bear the cost itself. In short, observing
the duty to assist may cost the ship operator financially, particularly if, as in
the case of the Tampa, the ship is prevented from promptly putting those
rescued ashore at a place of refuge. This calls for considerable altruism on
the part of the ship operator.
In a perfect world, the commercial cost of assisting those in danger at
sea would play no part in the shipmaster's decision about whether to obey
the legal and moral duty to stop and help. Sadly, because the legal duty to
assist can be ignored with relative impunity, the commercial implications are
likely to play a significant role in practice. 5 Part V will show the difficulty
in advancing a reasonably practicable way of enhancing the obligation to
provide assistance so that it would always outweigh the commercial
disincentives. Thus, the position of those in danger at sea, such as the
asylum seekers in the Tampa Incident, is perilous in many ways. Reluctance
on the part of coastal states, such as Australia, to allow persons in distress to
be delivered promptly to places of safety adds to their peril, by increasing
the likelihood that ships will simply pass them by.6 Forcing coastal states to
provide places of refuge once those in peril have been recovered prevents
5 In a reporting address to UNCLOS delegates, Douglas Stevenson, Director of the Center for
Seafarers' Rights in New York, states:
Evidence is hard to come by but there is no doubt that watchkeepers on some
vessels, at least, pointedly look the other way as they close on small craft far from the
shore. Quiet words have undoubtedly been spoken to masters about the inadvisability of
being too zealously on hand and available when possibly leaky and overcrowded refugee
vessels are seen trying to communicate with them.
Of Dogs, Fish and Men, LLOYD'S LIST, April 29, 2002, at 3.
I am indebted to Kassandra Slangan of the Tulane Law School Class of 2003 and former Tulane-
sponsored intem at the Center for Seafarers' Rights for bringing this item to my attention.
6 Since the Tampa incident, Australia has published a Protocol intended to provide guidance to
shipmasters after they have given assistance to persons in distress at sea. Department of Transport and
Regional Services, Transport and Infrastructure Policy: Protocol for Commercial Shipping Rescuing
Persons at Sea In or Adjacent to the Australian Search and Rescue Region,
http://www.dotars.gov.au/transinfra/sea_rescueprotocol.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2002). Significantly,
the Protocol does not contain any undertaking by Australia to allow rescued persons to be landed there. It
says merely that, "Where Australia is the proposed State of disembarkation the Government will make an
assessment as to the appropriateness of accepting the rescued persons, taking into account a range of factors
including customs, migration and security arrangements." Id
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costs from escalating once a rescue has occured,7 but it cannot overcome the
fundamental problem-the lack of force in the legal obligation to provide
assistance in the first place.
II. INTERNATIONAL SOURCES OF THE OBLIGATION TO ASSIST
Three international conventions impose a duty to provide assistance to
those in distress at sea. First, and most significant given the number of
countries that are party to it, is the Safety of Life at Sea Convention
(SOLAS), Ch. V, Regulation 10(a),8 which provides:
The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to
provide assistance, on receiving a signal from any source that
persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed
to their assistance, if possible informing them or the search and
rescue service that the ship is doing so.
As of August 15, 2002, 146 countries had adopted SOLAS, 9 including all
major flag of convenience countries.10
Regulation 10(a) purports to impose an obligation directly on the
shipmaster. However, in some countries, treaty provisions do not have
direct effect and so must be implemented by legislation.1 Some countries
that are parties to SOLAS may not have passed implementing legislation,'
and others may have implemented the obligation in a different form than it
appears in Regulation 10(a). Even in countries such as the United States,
7 The International Maritime Organization is conducting a review of international conventions with
the goal of ensuring that persons in distress at sea or other emergency situations are "promptly and
effectively delivered to a place of safety, regardless of their nationality and status or the circumstances in
which they are found." Tampa Incident Prompts Review of Refugee and Asylum Issues, IMO NEWS, Issue
4 2001, at 6. The I.M.O. response is considered by Frederick J. Kenney, Jr., & Vasilios Tasikas, The
Tampa Incident. IMO Perspectives and Responses on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, 12 Pac.
Rim L. & Pol'y J. 143 (2003).
8 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No.
9700, 164 U.N.T.S. 113 as amended (entered into force May 25, 1980) [hereinafter SOLAS], reprinted in
6D BENEDICT, supra note 3, Doc. No. 14-1.
9 Summary of Status of Conventions,
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic-id=247 (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) [hereinafter
Status of IMO Conventions].
1o All seven major flag of convenience countries (see supra note 2) are parties to SOLAS. Status of
Conventions-Complete List, at http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic id=248 (last visited
Nov. 3, 2002).
11 Australia is an example. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.12 Australia appears to be an example of this, too. See infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
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where treaties can have direct effect,' 3 Regulation 10(a) may require
implementing legislation. 14
Another treaty provision relating to the duty to assist is found in the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 98(l), 1" which
provides:
Every state shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in
so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the
crew or the passengers ... to render assistance to any person
found at sea in danger of being lost ... and to proceed with all
possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed
of their need for assistance, in so far as such action may
reasonably be expected of him.' 6
As of May 31, 2002, 138 countries had adopted UNCLOS, 17 including all
major flag of convenience countries except Liberia.18
Even in countries where treaties can have direct effect, 19 Article 98(1)
requires implementing legislation in order to acquire the force of law,
because it is addressed to states, not individuals.20  As noted above, some
13 See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
'4 This point is expanded later, infra Part 3(d). See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
'5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 and 6C
BENEDICT, supra note 3, Doc. No. 10-6.
6 Id. art. 98(1).
17 Chronological Lists of Ratifications of Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the
Related Agreements as of 12 November 2001,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference-files/chronological lists of ratifications.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2002) [hereinafter UNCLOS Parties].
Panama, The Bahamas, Malta, Cyprus, and Vanuatu (see supra note 2) are parties to UNCLOS.
See also UNCLOS Parties, supra note 17. Bermuda is an overseas territory of the U.K., which declared its
instruments of accession and ratification to extend to Bermuda (among other territories). THE LAW OF THE
SEA: DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA AND TO THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.3 (1997), available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention agreements/convention-declarations.htm#United%20Kmgdom
(last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
'9 Although the United States is in this category (see infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text), it is
not party to UNCLOS, because it does not agree with the provisions relating to mining on the sea-bed
beyond national jurisdiction. LORI F. DEMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1383 (4th ed. 2001). A compromise on this issue by special agreement concluded in 1994 led the U.S.
government to announce that it would move to adhere to the Convention and the 1994 Agreement, but the
U.S. Senate has not yet given its consent to ratification. Id.
20 To use the terminology employed in the United States, the U.N. convention is not self-executing.
See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
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countries that are party to UNCLOS may not have yet passed implementing
!eg.risatinn, despite their treaty obligation to do so.
Thirdly, the International Convention on Salvage 1989 ("Salvage
Convention") provides:
1. Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without
serious danger to his vessel and persons thereon, to render
assistance to any person in danger of being lost at sea.
2. The States Parties shall adopt the measures necessary to
enforce the duty set out in paragraph 1.
3. The owner of the vessel shall incur no liability for a
breach of the duty of the master under paragraph 1.21
As of July 30, 2002, forty countries had adopted the Salvage
Convention.22 The duty to render assistance under Article 10.1 of the
Salvage Convention cannot exist when the ship encounters a person in
danger of being lost at sea. The Convention only applies when "judicial or
arbitral proceedings relating to matters dealt with in this Convention are
brought in a State Party., 23 If the duty to render assistance does exist, it
exists only in inchoate form. For example, if a salvage arbitration or lawsuit
is subsequently brought in a Salvage Convention country, the application of
that country's implementation of the obligation is subsequently confirmed.
If no salvage proceedings are brought, the Salvage Convention never comes
into operation in relation to the incident. Thus, in many cases of ships
encountering refugees or asylum seekers needing assistance at sea, the duty
to assist under the Salvage Convention would not be applicable.
2! International Convention on Salvage, Apr. 28, 1989, art. 10, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-12 (entered
into force July 14, 1996) [hereinafter Salvage Convention), reprinted in 20 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 589 (1989).
22 Status of IMO Conventions, supra note 9.
23 Salvage Convention, supra note 21, art. 2.
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III. GIVING LEGAL FORCE TO THE OBLIGATION TO ASSIST
A. Introduction
In theory, the obligation to assist may be enforced either by civil
action or by criminal sanction.a4 In practice, civil actions alleging a failure
to assist are very unlikely. To have standing in a civil action, those who
claimed failure to assist must: (a) survive the ship's failure to pick them
up;2 5 (b) identify the ship that could have but did not pick them up; and, (c)
establish jurisdiction over the shipmaster and/or the ship itself in the country
of suit.26  The likelihood of all these conditions being satisfied is so small
that the prospect of civil action is not likely to provide much of a deterrent.
The threat of criminal sanction is more likely to provide the main legal
incentive for masters to comply with the obligation.
Because the need for assistance arises at sea, often beyond territorial
waters, the key question is which country has jurisdiction to enforce the
obligation to assist. The word "jurisdiction" is used in three different senses
toward giving force to criminal laws in an intemational context: prescriptive
jurisdiction (sometimes called legislative jurisdiction), adjudicative
jurisdiction, and enforcement jurisdiction.27 Prescriptive jurisdiction is a
country's right to apply its laws to an incident.28 Adjudicative jurisdiction is
24 See, e.g., Warshauer v. Lloyd Sabaudo, S.A., 71 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1934) (civil action brought by
those in disabled motorboat against owners of ship that passed by without rendering assistance); Martinez
v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgmt. Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1001 (S.D. Ala. 1990) (survivors of sailors who died
during rescue attempt sued would-be rescuers for negligently failing to provide assistance as required by 46
U.S.C. §2304).
2 A civil action could be brought by dependents if those in need of assistance were to die at sea, but
identification of the ship would obviously be much more difficult in such a case-indeed, almost
impossible unless a witness, such as a penitent crew member were to volunteer the information. See, e.g.,
Sangeorzan v. Yangming Marine Transp. Corp., 951 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (Romanian stowaways
died after being thrown overboard following their discovery on a Taiwanese ship and the surviving family
members sued shipowner relying on evidence of crew members as witnesses.).
2 The same point is made rather more colorfully in Patrick J. Long, Comment, The Good Samaritan
and Admiralty: A Parable of a Statute Lost at Sea, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 591, 610 (2000) ("Dead men tell no
tales. Nor do they sue.").
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
See also Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 145, 145 (1974)
(distinguishing executive jurisdiction, judicial jurisdiction, and legislative jurisdiction). Some writers
simply distinguish between jurisdiction to prescribe from jurisdiction to enforce, and divide enforcement
jurisdiction into adjudicative and executive enforcement. See, e g., 4 Louis HENKIN, International Law:
Politics, Values and Functions, General Course on Public International Law, in 216 RECuEa. DES COuRS
9, 313 (1989). For a useful overview of the academic debate about the meaning of "jurisdiction" in the
international criminal context, see Tapio Puurunen, The Legislative Jurisdiction of States Over
Transactions in International Electronic Commerce, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 689, 697-99
(2000).
28 RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 401(a).
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the power of a country to subject persons to its judicial process.29 Last,
enforcement jurisdiction is, the power to punish no-compiiancc with the
law.3° If a country wishes to prosecute a shipmaster for failing to provide
assistance to those in distress at sea, it must establish some basis for personal
jurisdiction over the master (adjudicative jurisdiction). 1 It must also justify
employing enforcement measures against him or her, particularly if he or she
is not present in the territory (enforcement jurisdiction). However, the first
and most fundamental question is whether that country can validly purport to
apply its laws to the master's conduct at all (prescriptive jurisdiction). 33
Because we are concerned mainly with the question of how the
obligation to assist acquires legal force at sea, the remaining sections of Part
III focus on the question of prescriptive jurisdiction.34 Part III.B examines
the question of which countries may validly apply their laws to regulate the
behavior of ships on the high seas. Part III.C considers the question of
which countries' laws can validly be applied to conduct occurring in
territorial waters. Part III.D and III.E then analyze the particular cases of the
United States and Australia (the country most closely associated with the
Tampa Incident), respectively.
B. The High Seas
There are five different bases for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
by a country: territoriality, which bases jurisdiction on the place where the
offense is committed; nationality, which bases jurisdiction on the nationality
or national character of the offender; protective, which bases jurisdiction on
a threat to national interests, such as security or important government
functions; passive personality, which bases jurisdiction on the nationality or
national character of the victim; and universal, which recognizes the right of
any nation to punish crimes against humanity. 35 Of these, territoriality is the
29 Id. § 401(b).
'o Id. § 401(c).
" Id. §§ 421, 422 (bases ofjurisdiction to adjudicate in criminal cases).
32 Id. § 431 (bases ofjurisdiction to enforce).
33 Id. § 402 (bases ofjurisdiction to prescribe).
34 Because the following parts of this Article are principally concerned with jurisdiction to prescribe,
the expression "the exercise of criminal jurisdiction" should be understood to mean "the valid application
of criminal laws" unless the context indicates otherwise.
35 Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime: Draft
Convention, with Comment, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Draft
Convention]. The Harvard Draft Convention formulation and the five named bases have been cited and
applied in U.S. courts on several occasions. See, e.g., Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885-86 (5th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257-58 (1st Cir. 1982); Chua Han Mow v. United States,
730 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Alomia-Riascos, 825 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir.
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most significant, because it provides the basis for the day-to-day exercise of
criminal jurisdiction within the territory of the country in question.36
Importantly, territoriality is often subdivided into subjective and objective
categories. 37 Subjective territoriality applies in the standard situation where
the offense or an element of it occurs within the state asserting jurisdiction;
objective territoriality applies when conduct outside the territory has an
effect within the territory.
38
Territoriality is the principle that allows a state to have jurisdiction
over conduct occurring on a ship flying the state's flag at sea, because of the
legal fiction that the ship is an extension of the territory of the country
whose flag it flies. 39 The primacy of the law of the flag is stated strongly in
Article 92(1) of UNCLOS, which provides:
Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in
exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties
or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive
jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may not change its flag
during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a
real transfer of ownership or change of registry.4°
Consistent with this statement, the obligation to assist in UNCLOS, Article
98(1) is addressed only to the flag state.4 1
1987); United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1307 (1lth Cir. 2000); United States v. Keller, 451 F.
Supp. 631, 634-35 (D.P.R. 1978). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 402. See generally
Christopher L. Blakesley, Introduction Brief Overview of the Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction Over
Extraterritorial Crime, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 33 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999);
Akehurst, supra note 27, at 145, 152-66; Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of U.S. Law Enforcement:
Does the Constitution Come Along?, 39 HOUs. L. REV. 307, 314-25 (2002).36 "[T]he first [basis for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and territoriality] is everywhere
regarded as of primary importance and of fundamental character." Harvard Draft Convention, supra note
35, at 445.
37 Blakesley, supra note 35, at 47; Tuerkheimer, supra note 35, at 315.
38 Blakesley, supra note 35, at 47; Tuerkheimer, supra note 35, at 315. The objective territoriality
principle is often associated with Justice Holmes' observation in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285
(1911) ("Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within
it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should
succeed in getting him within its power.").
39 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933) ("A merchant vessel . . . for purposes of the
jurisdiction of the courts of the sovereignty whose flag it flies to punish crimes committed upon it, is
deemed to be a part of the territory of that sovereignty..."); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306,
313 n.l (1970).
40 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 92(1). See, e.g., United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 840 (1st Cir.
1980) (United States Coast Guard authorized to board U.S.-flagged vessel on high seas, despite foreign
nationality of owner, because ship had U.S. nationality by virtue of U.S. registration; relying on
predecessor to UNCLOS).
41 See UNCLOS, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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Although Article 92(1) states that the jurisdiction of the flag state is
exclusive on the high seas, any of the other bases of international criminal
jurisdiction may authorize application of a country's laws to acts committed
on a foreign-flagged ship on the high seas. For example, in United States v.
Pizdrint,42 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that
the United States could properly exercise criminal jurisdiction over an
assault and battery committed on a Liberian-flagged cruise ship on the high
seas, because of the effect the defendant's actions had within the United
States.43  Similarly, the United States often relies on the objective
territoriality principle and/or the protective principle as the basis for
prosecuting drug smugglers bound for the United States on foreign ships in
the high seas.44
Thus, it may be possible for countries other than the flag state to assert
criminal jurisdiction due to a failure by a shipmaster to give assistance to
people in distress on the high seas. However, any extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction asserted by the non-flag state would then be concurrent with the
subjective territorial jurisdiction of the flag state over the same incident.45
As a matter of international law, it is not clear which country's sovereignty
46
should yield when jurisdiction is asserted by both.
In cases of crimes committed on foreign ships in territorial waters,
U.S. courts have held that the law of the flag state should prevail in relation
to matters of internal discipline aboard the vessel. They have also held,
however, that the law of the coastal state should apply to serious matters
involving "the peace or dignity of the country, or the tranquility of the
42 United States v. Pizdrint, 983 F. Supp. 1110 (M.D. Fla. 1997). See also United States v. Roberts,
1 F. Supp.2d 601 (E.D. La. 1998) (authorizing exercise of jurisdiction in relation to sexual abuse of a minor
on Liberian-flagged vessel on the high seas).
43 The court said that this departure from the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state was justified by
"the objective territorial exception." Pizdrint, 983 F. Supp. at 1112; Accord Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d
1124 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (1lth Cit. 1985); United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1 (1st Cit. 1988); United
States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cit. 1990); United States v. Angola, 514 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Fla. 1981);
United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
45 2 BENEDICT, supra note 3, § 1 12b[6].
46 There are no general principles of customary international law governing such situations. Flores,
289 U.S. 137 (citing PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION,
144-93 (1927)). See also HENKIN, supra note 27, at 282-85; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction
for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 82
(2001) (stating "[P]rivate international law has not yet developed rules or criteria of sufficient clarity to
consider priorities in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction whenever more than one state claims
jurisdiction."). As a result, states have been left to resort to bilateral treaties in an effort to protect their
nationals from double or conflicting liability, particularly in the area of tax law. Puurunen, supra, note 27,
at 712.
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port, 47 unless there has been no assertion of jurisdiction by the coastal state,
in which case the law of the flag state may be applied.48 A non-flag state's
extraterritorial application of its laws to a foreign vessel in the high seas is
weaker than that of a coastal state applying its laws to serious offenses on
foreign vessels in its territorial waters. In these circumstances, it seems both
appropriate and consistent with the spirit of UNCLOS, Article 92(1), to
grant precedence to the flag states law in all high seas cases, and also to
recognize non-flag states jurisdiction if the flag state has not done So.4 9 This
seems to be the best explanation of Pizdrint,50 where U.S. law was applied
under the objective territoriality principle in circumstances where there was
no indication that the flag state (Liberia) had taken or would take action to
prosecute the alleged offender.5'
Whether or not this proposed solution is the best one in all cases of
concurrent criminal jurisdiction on the high seas, it is appropriate to enforce
the obligation to give assistance to those in distress at sea. Concurrentjurisdiction only creates difficulties where there are conflicts between the
laws of the two countries asserting jurisdiction. This might happen, for
example, when a person is forbidden by one law to commit an act that is
permitted or required by another law.52  In the situation presently under
consideration, there is no true conflict; the laws of both flag state and non-
flag state should require the shipmaster to give assistance, by virtue of one
or more of the conventions considered above, or domestic legislation
implementing them. Thus, the non-flag state's interests should be
adequately protected by enforcement of the convention norms by the flag
state.
In summary, international law bestows precedence to flag state
enforcement to incidents on the high seas, but allow assertions of
47 Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail (Wildenhus' Case), 120 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1887).
48 See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933) (defendant charged under U.S. law with murder
committed on a U.S. vessel 250 miles up the Congo River; no local action taken); United States v. Reagan,
453 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1971) (defendant charged under U.S. law of voluntary manslaughter committed on a
U.S. vessel in German port; German authorities had considered charging defendant but decided not to doSO).
49 2 BENEDICT, supra note 3, § I 12b[6]. See also George K. Walker, The Interface of Criminal
Jurisdiction and Actions Under the United Nations Charter with Admiralty Law, 20 TUL. MAR. L.J. 217,
227-37 (1996).
50 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51 See also accord United States v. Roberts, I F. Supp.2d 601, 607 (E.D. La. 1998) ("The Court must
also add that the country whose flag the cruise ship flies under, Liberia, has little to no interest in the
alleged offense because neither the victim nor the defendant are [sic] Liberian, the vessel does not operate
in or around Liberian territory, and the vessel's owners center their corporate operations in the United
States.").
52 Akehurst, supra note 27, at 167-68; Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of
US. Law, 24 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 76-77 (1992).
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jurisdiction by non-flag states if the flag state has taken no action. At first
glance, the possibilitr nf nnn-flag state enforcement may provide a
promising alternative to the predictable inaction expected of a flag of
convenience flag state. However, it is very unlikely that any country other
than the flag state would be authorized to take action in any event, or would
be willing to do so if authorized.
1. Objective Territoriality
Objective territoriality applies when conduct outside the territory has
an adverse effect within the territory.53 In Pizdrint,54 the court held that the
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction was justified under the objective territorial
principle, because in part, the cruise on which the assault occurred,
originated, and terminated in the United States, and the F.B.I. became
involved when the ship arrived in the United States. 55 If territorial contacts
and police investigations were sufficient to justify the assertion of
jurisdiction, there might be a basis for a non-flag state to assert jurisdiction
over a ship when the shipmaster failed to give assistance to those in distress
at sea, the ship was in the non-flag state's port, and the non-flag state's
police force or Coast Guard were called on to conduct an investigation at
that port. It seems unlikely, however, that the mere fact of investigation
would be sufficient in itself to justify the assertion of jurisdiction. In
Pizdrint, there were several other factors connecting the incident with the
United States, including the nationality of the victim, the nationality of the
other passengers on the ship (potential witnesses), and the permanent
residence of the defendant.56 In the case of persons in distress at sea, it
would be very unusual to find so many objective connecting factors pointing
towards a single country.
It seems more likely that the persons in need of assistance would be
citizens of one country, the shipmaster a citizen of another, the ship's last
port of call would be in a third country and its next port of call (and the
possible site of an investigation) in a fourth. The Tampa Incident provides a
typical example: the passengers on the sinking ferry were Afghans and
Iraqis, the master of the Tampa was Norwegian, the ship's last port of call
before encountering the ferry was in Australia and its next port of call was in
53 See supra notes 35, 38 and accompanying text.
54 See supra note 42.
55 United States v. Pizdrint, 983 F. Supp. 1110, 1113 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
56 Id. See also accord Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 608 (listing similar objective effects as authorizing
exercise ofjurisdiction under the objective effect principle).
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Singapore. 7  If the Tampa had not rescued those in peril, the most
significant and relevant adverse effects would have been on Afghanistan,
Iraq, and possibly Singapore.5 8  Afghanistan and Iraq would presumably
have shown little interest in prosecuting the master, despite the objective
effect on their citizens, because those citizens were fleeing from their ruling
regimes. Afghanistan would probably not have had any laws to enforce
against a master who failed to pick up its citizens at sea, because it is not
party to UNCLOS, SOLAS, or the Salvage Convention.5 9 There would only
be an objective effect in Singapore if Singapore were to take steps to
investigate the master's failure to pick up the refugees. As noted above, it is
doubtful whether territorial contacts would be enough to justify an assertion
of criminal jurisdiction by Singapore, in the absence of other objective
connecting factors.
In summary, it can be said that if several connecting factors point
towards a single country so that there is a considerable objective effect
within that country (as there was in Pizdrint), then there may be a basis for
that country to assert jurisdiction under the objective territoriality principle,
even though it is not the flag state. However, in the context of refugees in
peril at sea, the country with the most conflicts is the one from which the
refugees are fleeing; such a country will not be enthusiastic about taking
action.
2. Nationality Jurisdiction
Nationality jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national
character of the offender.60  For example, in Reg. v. Kelly,61 the House of
57 White, supra note 4, at 7.58 Of course, in the Tampa Incident itself, there was considerable objective effect on Australia, but
that was principally because Capt Rinnan did pick up the refugees. Here we are imagining what would
have been the objective effects if he had not done so.
59 Status of IMO Conventions, supra note 9, UNCLOS Parties, supra note 17. Afghanistan's non-
membership is at least partly explained by the fact that it is a land-locked nation. That is not enough in
itself to explain non-membership, however, as many land-locked nations are parties to the convention. A.
MPAZi SINJELA, LAND-LOCKED STATES AND THE UNCLOS REGIME (1983). Iraq is party to UNCLOS and
SOLAS, but not the Salvage Convention. Status of IMO Conventions, supra note 9; UNCLOS Parties,
supra note 17.
60 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. The United States has only sparingly relied on this
pnnciple to apply its laws to individuals living abroad on the basis of their U.S. nationality or permanent
residence. RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, §402, note 1. Rare examples include the treason statute, 18
U.S C. §2381 (2000). See Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 929-30 (1st Cir. 1948). In the context
of crimes at sea, Congress relied on the national principle in 1994 when enacting 18 U.S.C. §7(8) (2000).
See infra notes 67, 68 and accompanying text.
61 Regina v. Kelly, 1987 App. Cas 665.
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Lords affirmed the conviction of British subjects in a British court for
otienses of crimina .darnge con i while they passengers on a
Danish-flagged ship on the high seas. The British subjects were brought
before the court by operation of a U.K. statute asserting jurisdiction over
British subjects committing offenses on foreign ships.62  Although
jurisdiction was based on the offenders' British nationality, it is also
significant that the ship's next port of call was in the United Kingdom.
63
That fact provides a ready explanation for why the British police were
prepared to investigate the incident and the prosecuting authorities later
chose to prosecute the offenders. The scenario might have been different in
a case where there was no immediate impact in the offender's country.
If the Tampa had been registered in Panama rather than Norway, for
example, nationality jurisdiction would still have justified an assertion of
jurisdiction by Norway as a non-flag state if Capt. Rinnan, a Norwegian
citizen, had failed to pick up the Afghan and Iraqi persons in need of help.
Norway, however, would have had to feel very strongly about the
importance of aiding those in distress at sea in order to justify taking action
against one of its citizens for failing to aid foreigners while sailing on a
foreign-flagged ship between ports in foreign countries.
In summary, it can be said that although nationality jurisdiction
provides a possible basis for the assertion of criminal jurisdiction, it will not
often prevail as the sole basis for prosecuting a failure to provide assistance
to those in distress at sea; instead, it may be used in conjunction with one or
more of the other jurisdictional bases.
3. The Passive Personality Principle
Passive personality jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national
character of the victim.64 In the case of a failure to assist refugees or asylum
seekers needing assistance at sea, the country from which the refugees were
fleeing could assert criminal jurisdiction over the shipmaster based on
passive personality. Like objective territoriality,65 however, it is doubtful
that any country would go to the trouble of exercising extra-territorial
62 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60, §686(1) (Eng.). The opinion of the House of
Lords was based on interpretation of this statute, rather than any consideration of principles of international
law. See Regina v. Kelly, 1987 App. Cas. 665.
63 Regina v. Kelly, 1987 App. Cas. 665.
64 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See generally Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive
Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT'LL. J. 1 (1993).
65 See infra Section III.B. 1
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criminal jurisdiction in order to protect the interests of citizens who have
been forced to flee its territory.
Although the United States has historically been opposed to
jurisdiction based on passive personality, 66 its use in the context of crimes at
sea was explicitly endorsed by Congress in 1994 with the introduction of 18
U.S.C. §7(8) (2002). This legislation provides that the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States67 extends "[rio the extent
permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a voyage having a
scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with respect to an
offense committed by or against a national of the United States."6  Because
few, if any, refugees or asylum seekers at sea are likely to be nationals of the
United States, this provision has no direct impact on the situation presently
under consideration, but it may apply to U.S. nationals in need of assistance
at sea for other reasons, such as survivors of a shipwreck.
4. Protective Jurisdiction
A state's protective jurisdiction is based on a threat to its national
69interests, such as security or important government functions. It differs
from objective territoriality in that it is not necessary for the acts in question
to have any actual effect within the territory, provided there is a threat to
national interests.70 In the United States, at least, its use has generally been
confined to cases involving actual or attempted illegal immigration71 or
attempted drug smuggling.72  Like passive personality, 73  protective
6 Tuerkheimer, supra note 35, at 320.67 See infra Section m.B.4.
68 18 U.S.C. §7(8). Use of the passive personality principle has recently been revitalized in the
context of anti-terrorist legislation. Accord Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (citing authorities). See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, §402 cmt. (g) (1987) (passive personality principle "has not been generally
accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other
organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a state's
diplomatic representatives or other officials.").
69 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
70 United States v. Khalje, 658 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1981) (jurisdiction based on protective principle
where no actual effects in the United States justifying the use of objective territoriality principle).
71 See, eg., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968) (false visa application in U.S.
Consulate in Montreal); United States v. Williams, 464 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1972) (acts in Jamaica
inducing illegal immigrants to enter the United States); United States v. Khalje, 658 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir.
1981) (false visa application in U.S. Consulate in Montreal); United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808, 811-12
(4th Cir. 1972) (obtaining false military pass in Germany); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 549 (9th
Cir. 1961) (sham marriages in Mexico for U.S. immigration purposes).
72 United States v. Angola, 514 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D. Fla. 1981); United States v. Romero-Galue,
757 F.2d 1146, 1154 (1 th Cir. 1985); United States v. Alomia-Riascos, 825 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp.
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jurisdiction has also been invoked recently in the United States to justify
extraterritorial jurisdiction in its anti-terrorist legislation. 74
It is difficult to imagine how a non-flag state could use the protective
principle to justify the assertion of criminal jurisdiction over a shipmaster
failing to rescue those in need of assistance at sea. The relevant
international conventions are plainly designed for the protection of
individuals, not broad national interests or an entire national community.
Even if the preservation of the life and health of individual people were
regarded as a sufficiently important national interest to justify invocation of
the principle, it would then only justify the assertion of jurisdiction by the
country whose people were threatened by inaction. In the context of
refugees and asylum seekers at sea, that country would once again be the
country from which they are fleeing persecution. Just as objective
territoriality and passive personality are weak bases for a non-flag state to
exercise jurisdiction, the chances are remote that a country would exercise
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction to protect the interests of those seeking
refuge from its regime.
5. Universal Jurisdiction
Universal jurisdiction was originally confined to cases of piracy, 75 but
has expanded to include other offenses, such as slave trading, war crimes,
genocide, torture, and other human rights violations.76 Unless an applicable
treaty specifically provides a basis for universal jurisdiction, its exercise is
generally reserved for the most serious international crimes - crimes that
shock the conscience.77 The rationale behind the exercise of universal
jurisdiction is that states act as a surrogate for the international community
1437, 1444-45 (N.D. Cal. 1988). See generally Christina E. Sorensen, Comment, Drug Trafficking on the
High Seas. A Move Toward Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 4 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 207,
217-19 (1990).
73 See supra note 68.
74 Tuerkheimer, supra note 35, at 319-20.
75 Bassiouni, supra note 46, at 108-112; Akehurst, supra note 27, at 160. See also The Malek Adhel,
2 How. 210, 232 (1844); In re Piracy lure Gentiurn, 1934 App. Cas. 586, 589 (P.C. 1934). Universal
jurisdiction for piracy now has a treaty basis. See UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 105.
76 Bassiouni, supra note 46, at 112-34; Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEX. L. REv. 785, 789 (1988); RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, §404. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (Stating that Israel had universal jurisdiction to prosecute
alleged war criminals). Offenses committed on stateless vessels are also subject to universal jurisdiction
because such vessels do not fall within the veil of a sovereign's territorial protection, and so all nations can
treat them as their own territory and subject them to their laws. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d
1373, 1382-83 (1lth Ci. 1982); United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1995). Of course,
few, if any, ships encountering refugees or asylum seekers in distress at sea will be stateless vessels.
77 Bassiouni, supra note 46, at 82.
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because: (1) no other state can exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the
traditional doctrines; (2) no other state has a direct interest; and (3) the
international community has an interest to enforce.78 These conditions are
not satisfied in the situation under consideration here, because several states
potentially have a direct interest and a basis for exercising jurisdiction under
the traditional doctrines. Sailing past those in distress at sea might be
considered serious, but it is not serious enough to justify universal
jurisdiction. Universal condemnation of an act is not sufficient to make the
universal principle applicable.
79
6. Summary in Relation to the High Seas
There are various bases in international law for a non-flag to assert
criminal jurisdiction over events occurring on a ship in the high seas. In the
case of a failure to provide assistance to those in distress in the high seas,
however, the non-flag state most likely entitled to take action is the country
of citizenship of those in distress. In the case of refugees and asylum
seekers needing assistance, that country will probably be reluctant to take
action. Unless the country of citizenship of the shipmaster is inclined to take
action based on the nationality principle, the only country that can give legal
force to the obligation to assist on the high seas is the flag state.
Flag-of-convenience flag states are notoriously unlikely to enforce the
obligation to provide assistance. Liberia, the second-largest flag-of-
convenience state,80 has neither the means nor the inclination to give legal
force to the international conventions described in Part II.81 Other flag-of-
" Id. at 96.
'9 Id at 90.
:0 See supra note 2.
1 See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing enforcement ofjudgment
of Liberian court on grounds that Liberia did not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
due process). The District Court decision affirmed by the Second Circuit contains an extensive description
of the conditions in Liberia and their effect on the legal system. See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F.
Supp. 2d 276, 278-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The Second Circuit noted that the Country Reports prepared by the
State Department under Congressional directives were rightfully admitted as evidence. Bridgeway, 201
F.3d at 143. The latest State Department Country Report on Liberia says, "The judicial system is
functional but extensively manipulated by the executive branch," but notes that: "Liberia is still trying to
recover from the ravages of war. Five years after the war, pipe-bome water and electricity are still
unavailable and schools, hospitals, roads, and infrastructure remain derelict." Background Note Liberia,
http.//www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.hm (last visited Aug 20, 2002). The Libenan ship registry does
have an office in Monrovia, Liberia, but its headquarters are in the United States, in Vienna, Virginia.
Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry, http://www.liscr.com/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2002).
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convenience countries, such as Vanuatu and the Marshall Islands,8 2 are so
small and so poor that they do not have the resources to pursue extra-
territorial enforcement of their laws.
83
C. In Territorial Waters
For incidents occurring in territorial waters, both the flag state and the
coastal state have a valid claim to exercise jurisdiction under the territoriality
principle. Because territorial waters are subject to the sovereignty of the
coastal state,84 that country's claim to exercise jurisdiction over part of its
sovereign territory would be clearly paramount. 85  International law,
however, also recognizes that ships have a right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea. 6  Article 27(1) of UNCLOS resolves the overlap of
jurisdiction in the following way:
The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be
exercised on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial
8 Vanuatu is the seventh-largest flag of convenience country. U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2001, supra note 2. The Marshall Islands is the seventeenth
largest flag of convenience country. Id.
83 The economy of Vanuatu is based primarily on subsistence or small-scale agriculture; U.S.
Government assistance is the mainstay of the tiny Marshall Islands economy. Vanuatu and Marshall
Islands, C.I.A. WORLD FACTBOOK 2001, at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (last
visited Aug. 19, 2002). Neither country has many natural resources, and in both, imports far exceed
exports. Id. For accounts of some of the problems besetting the Marshall Islands, see Hyun S. Lee, Post
Trusteeship Environmental Accountability: Case of PCB Contamination on the Marshall Islands, 26 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 399 (1998); John C. Babione, Note, Mission Accomplished? Fifty-Four Years of
Suffering for the People of the Marshall Islands and the Latest Round of Endless Reconciliation, 11 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 115 (2000); J. Chris Larson, Note, Racing the Rising Tide: Legal Options for the
Marshall Islands, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 495 (2000).
84 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 2(1). "The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land
territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea." Id.
85 For example, in Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, the court stated:
The merchant ship of one country voluntarily entering the territorial limits of
another subjects herself to the jurisdiction of the latter. The jurisdiction attaches in virtue
of her presence, just as with other objects within those limits. During her stay she is
entitled to the protection of the laws of that place and correlatively is bound to yield
obedience to them.
Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 124 (1923).
86 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 17: "[S]hips of all states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea." See generally PHILIP JESSUP, THE LAW OF
TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION, 120 (1927) ("The right of innocent passage seems to
be the result of an attempt to reconcile the freedom of ocean navigation with the theory of territorial
waters.").
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sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in
connection with any crime committed on board the ship during
its passage, save only in the following cases:
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal
State;
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the
country or the good order of the territorial sea;
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been
requested by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic
agent or consular officer of the flag State; or
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances .
The position in the United States, which is not party to UNCLOS,88 is
similar to the language of Article 27(1). As noted above, the practice in U.S.
courts is that the law of the flag state prevails in matters of internal
discipline aboard the vessel, but the law of the coastal state applies to serious
matters involving "the peace or dignity of the country, or the tranquility of
the port" unless there has been no assertion of jurisdiction by the coastal
state, in which case the law of the flag state may be applied. 89
Leaving endangered people to meet their fate without assistance
seems clearly to disturb the "good order" of the territorial sea and is likely to
have consequences that extend to the coastal state. For many coastal states,
those consequences stem in part from their obligations under the
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue ("SAR
Convention"). 90 The SAR Convention requires parties, either individually or
in cooperation with other states, to participate in the development of search
and rescue services to ensure that assistance is rendered to persons in
distress at sea.91 Further, parties are required to ensure that assistance is
provided to any person in distress at sea, regardless of their nationality or
87 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 27(1).
88 See DEMROSCH ET AL., supra note 19.
89 Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail (Wildenhus' Case), 120 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1887). See also note
48 and accompanying text.
9 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979 (entered into force on
June 27, 1985), T.I.A.S. No. 11093, (as amended May 18, 1998 by resolution of the IMO's Maritime
Safety Committee (Res. MSC.70(69)) with effect from Jan. 1, 2000) [hereinafter SAR Convention],
reprinted in 6 BENEDICT, supra note 3, Doc. No. 3-14. As of August 15, 2002, seventy-three countries are
party to the SAR Convention. Status ofIMO Conventions, supra note 9.
9' SAR Convention, supra note 90, Annex, art. 2.1.1.
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status or the circumstances in which they are found. 92 If a coastal state that
is party to the SAR Convention were to direct a commercial ship to provide
assistance to persons in distress at sea, 93 that country would be entitled to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over the master if he or she refused to comply,
regardless of whether the ship was on innocent passage at the time.
In summary, the prospects of enforcement are much stronger in
territorial waters than they are on the high seas. The primary jurisdiction
lies with the coastal state, rather than the flag state. The flag state would still
be entitled to take action if the coastal state did not. 94
D. The United States Position
The United States is not a party to UNCLOS, 95 but it is party to the
Salvage Convention, SOLAS and the SAR Convention. 96  Although the
SOLAS treaty as a whole forms part of the "supreme Law of the Land,, 97 it
is very doubtful whether a master could be prosecuted for violating SOLAS,
Ch. V, Regulation 10(a) itself.98 Treaty provisions only create individual
rights and obligations if they are "self-executing. '99 The question of
whether a treaty is self-executing is a very difficult one to be considered in
detail in this context.' °° Most judicial considerations address whether a
92 Id. Annex, art. 2.1.10.
93 The Tampa did not encounter the sinking ferry by chance; it was sent to investigate by Australian
Search and Rescue ("AusSAR"), a division of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority ("AMSA").
Michael White, The TAMPA and the Law, SEAWAYS, THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE NAUTICAL
INSTITUTE 5 (Oct. 2001); Tauman, supra note 1, at 463-64.
94 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
95 UNCLOS Parties, supra note 17.
9 Status of IMO Conventions, supra note 9.
97 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
98 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
99 SOLAS; see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314, 7 L. Ed. 415, 435 (1829) (Marshall,
C.J.) (treaty "equivalent to an act of the legislature whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision"). The earliest use by the Supreme Court of the term "self-executing" appears to have
been in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also David Sloss, The Domestication of
International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J.
INT'LL. 129, 146 (1999).
'00 The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties has been described as the
"most confounding" in the U.S. law of treaties. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D. Fla. 1992). For a detailed examination of the
question, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
695 (1995); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1082 (1992); Jordan Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AMER. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Yuji Iwasawa,
The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627
(1986).
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treaty confers an individual right of action' °1 or provides a defense to a
criminal prosecution, 12 rather than if a treaty can impose an obligation on an
individual enforceable by prosecution. It is generally assumed, however,
that a treaty creating an international crime could not itself become part of
the criminal law of the United States, but would require Congress to enact an
appropriate statute before an individual could be tried or punished for the
offense. 103
As a result, any prosecution of a master for failing to pick up those in
need of assistance at sea must be for violation of some federal or state
criminal statute. So far as federal law is concerned, the most significant
provision is 46 U.S.C. §2304(2000), which provides:
(a) A master or individual in charge of a vessel shall render
assistance to any individual found at sea in danger of being lost,
so far as the master or individual in charge can do so without
serious danger to the master's or individual's vessel or
individuals on board.
(b) A master or individual violating this section shall be
fined not more than $1,000, imprisoned for not more than 2
years, or both.1
0 4
Because there are no provisions indicating the geographical scope of
operation of this section, any application of it would have to be justified by
101 See, eg., McKesson H.B.O.C., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (whether Treaty of Amity between Iran and U.S. created private right of action for expropriation of
property by Iran).
102 For example, the Supreme Court recently stated in dicta that the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations "arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest." Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam). As a result, there have been many cases in which
defendants have sought to have indictments quashed or evidence suppressed because of a failure to provide
them with consular assistance. One Circuit Court has held that the Convention provides no individual right
to assistance. United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 2001). Others have held that
whether or not the Vienna Convention creates individual rights, quashing of an indictment or suppression
of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for violation of those rights. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60-
61, 66 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States. v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 541 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d
882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986-87 (10th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212
F.3d 1194, 1196 (1 1th Cir. 2000); United States v. Duarte-Acero, --- F.3d ---, 2002 WL 1491634, *4 (1 th
Cir. 2002).
103 RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, §111 cmt. i, note 6.
104 See generally, Long, supra note 26 (considering legislative history and general maritime law
context of 46 U.S.C. §2304).
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one of the jurisdictional principles identified in previous section, such as the
American nationality of the victim10 5 or the offender.1
0 6
Title 18 of the U.S. Code also creates offenses in relation to conduct
in the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,"
which includes:
The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the
jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in
whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to
any corporation created by or under the laws of the United
States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof,
when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of
any particular State.'
0 7
The reach of the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction" is far
from clear. 108 The difficulty in defining the reach of the statute arises in part
because of the use of the vague term "belonging," both in 18 U.S.C. §7(1)
and also in 18 U.S.C. §9, which provides that the term "vessel of the United
States" means a vessel "belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or
any citizen thereof, or any corporation created by or under the laws of the
United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof."' 0 9
A ship registered in the United States is plainly within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction when on the high seas."l0 A ship on the
high seas is also within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction if the
registered owner is a U.S. citizen or U.S. corporation."' l A ship may even
105 See, e.g., Warshauer v. Lloyd Sabaudo, S.A., 71 F.2d 146, (2d Cir. 1934) (predecessor of 46
U.S.C. §2304 applied to Italian ship failing to give assistance to U.S. citizens; no explicit consideration of
basis for application of statute). Compare Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nay. Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers,
Inc., 418 F. Supp. 656, 660, (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("As a foreign flag vessel operating in international waters,
the S.S. Canberra was not subject to the criminal sanctions of 46 U.S.C. §728 [predecessor of 46 U.S.C.
§2304].").
106 See, e.g. Martinez v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgmt. Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1001 (S.D. Ala. 1990) (46
U.S.C. §2304 applied to U.S. ship negligently failing to provide assistance to Honduran fishermen; no
explicit consideration of basis for application of statute).
t07 18 U.S.C. § 7(1).
108 Id.
1o9 Id.
110 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 352 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Ross, 439 F.2d
1355 (9th Cir. 1971).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Zenon-Encarnacion, 185 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135 (D.P.R., 2001) (military
vessel owned by United States itself).
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be within these jurisdictions if there are U.S. citizens among the
shareholders in a foreign corporation that is the ship's registered owner."12
Some courts have even suggested that the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction extends to the high seas generally, whether or not the ship in
question is even partly American-owned, 13 although others disagree on this
point. 114  The special maritime and territorial jurisdiction undoubtedly
applies to offenses committed by or against U.S. nationals on foreign-
flagged ships having a scheduled departure from or arrival to the United
States, by operation of 18 U.S.C. §7(8).
The scope of special maritime and territorial jurisdiction is limited by
provisions of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. 15 In the context of a failure to pick
up those in distress at sea, the only relevant provisions in Title 18 that apply
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction are: 18 U.S.C.
§1111(b) (murder); 18 U.S.C. §1112(b) (manslaughter); 18 U.S.C. §1113
(murder or manslaughter attempts); and 18 U.S.C. §1115 (making it an
offense for any "captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on any
steamboat or vessel" to "destroy" the life of any person by "misconduct,
negligence, or inattention to his duties on such vessel.)
Causing death by a deliberate failure to pick up those in need of
assistance at sea could be manslaughter"16 and would probably constitute a
violation of 18 U.S.C. §1115."' Although the obligation imposed by
112 United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 636 (D.P.R. 1978) (U.S. citizens' ownership of shares
in, and control of, Grand Cayman corporation that was the registered owner of U.S.-registered ship held to
be sufficient for 18 U.S.C. §7(l)). However, this conclusion was not necessary for the court's decision,
because the defendants were not charged with offenses under Title 18, so 18 U.S.C. §7(1) was irrelevant.
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 840 (1st Cir. 1980), affirming Keller on other grounds. Nevertheless,
this part of the Keller court's decision has been applied in later cases. United States v. Pizdrint, 983 F.
Supp. 1110, 1112 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (sufficient for §7(1) that some shareholders of Panamanian corporation
that was as registered owner of ship were U.S. citizen); Zenon-Encarnacion, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 134.
13 Nixon, 352 F.2d at 602; United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 140-41 (7th Cir. 1972) (18 U.S.C.
§7(1) applied to Canadian ship on high seas); United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1978).
Accord United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp.2d 601, 604-05 (E.D. La. 1998) 604-5 (collecting conflicting
authorities without needing to choose between them).
114 United States v. McRary, 665 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (Section 7(1) restricted to
vessels owned wholly or in part by U.S. citizens); United States v. Ross, 439 F.2d 1355, 1357-58 (9th Cir.
1971) (implying that ship must be both on the high seas and registered in the United States).
115 Thus, it does not provide a basis for an extended application of 46 U.S.C. §2304. See supra note
104 and accompanying text; United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 290 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980); Arra,
630 F.2d at 840; Perez v. Bahamas, 652 F.2d 186, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also United States v. Zenon,
182 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213 (D.P.R , 2002) (emphasizing that not all offenses in Title 18 are expressed to
apply throughout the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction).
116 United States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800, 802 (D.C. Cal. 1864) (No. 15,540) (failure to pick up a
person falling overboard is manslaughter).
117 See, e.g., United States v. Fei, 225 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Hui, 83 F.3d 592 (2d
Cir. 1996); United States v. Lee, 122 F.3d 1058 (1995 WL 595065) (2d Cir. 1995) (unpublished table
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SOLAS, Ch. V, Regulation 10(a) may not be self-executing, 118 it is relevant
in esta blis ,-ing "m,sconduct t he purpose s of I 111.
If the ship's failure to assist did not result in deaths, the only relevant
provision in Title 18 is 18 U.S.C. §1 113, attempted murder or manslaughter.
If causing death by a deliberate failure to pick up persons in need of distress
amounts to manslaughter,1 19 deliberately sailing past them should amount to
attempted manslaughter if they survive.
State criminal law statutes may also be relevant. For example, a
Florida statute provides that offenses that are punishable if committed within
the state are punishable in the same manner when committed within the
state's special maritime criminal jurisdiction, which is broadly defined. 120 In
State v. Stepansky,121 the defendant was charged under Florida state law with
burglary and attempted sexual battery on the high seas while on board a
Liberian-flagged cruise ship owned by a British West Indies corporation.
Florida argued that the alleged offenses occurred in the state's special
maritime criminal jurisdiction because over half of the revenue passengers
on board the ship originally embarked and planned to disembark finally in
Florida. 122 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected the defendant's challenge
of the constitutional validity of the Florida statute, holding that Congress's
constitutional power to punish felonies on the high seas does not bar state
prosecution. 23 The court held that jurisdiction could properly be asserted
under the objective territorial principle, because of the effect the alleged
offenses had in Florida,124  and also under the passive personalityprinciple. 125
decision) (all considering convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1115 for causing death of illegal immigrants who
attempted to swim ashore after the ship carrying them was intentionally grounded).
" RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 111 cmt. i, note 6.
19 See supra note 116.
120 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 910.006(3), (4) (West 2002).
121 761 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied sub nom, Stepansky v. Florida, 531 U.S. 959 (2000).
122 Id. at 1030, referring to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 910.006(3)(d) (West 2002).
123 Id. at 1034-35.
124 Id. at 1035-36. The court referred to the relevant principle as the "effects doctrine," but cited
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1035.
125 The court did not refer to the passive personality principle by name, but said that the defendant did
not dispute that the United States could prosecute him by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 7 (8), which is a
manifestation of the passive personality principle. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. The
court said that the State of Florida could prosecute the defendant on the same basis if its actions did not
conflict with federal law. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1032-33.
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E. The Position in Australia
Australia is party to UNCLOS, 2 6  SOLAS and the Salvage
Convention,127 but treaties are not self-executing under Australian law, with
the result that implementing legislation is always required.128  The only
relevant legislation is the Navigation Act, 1912, Section 317A, that provides:
The master of a ship shall, so far as he or she can do so without
serious danger to his or her ship, its crew and passengers (if
any), render assistance to any person, even if such person be a
subject of a foreign State at war with Australia, who is found at
sea in danger of being lost. 1
29
Although it has been said that this provision is an implementation of
Australia's obligations under UNCLOS, 130 that seems incorrect. Section
317A applies only when "judicial or arbitral proceedings relating to the
provision of salvage operations are brought in Australia."'13' Section 317A is
a legislative implementation of the Salvage Convention, not the SOLAS or
UNCLOS provisions relating to the rendering of assistance. 132 Therefore,
the provision has very limited application and would not have applied to the
Tampa Incident. Because there are no other provisions in Australian
legislation, it appears that Australian law does not impose a general statutory
obligation on masters to assist those in distress at sea.
IV. THE COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF DELAY
A ship's delay imposes costs in two ways. First, there are extra out-
of-pocket expenses, such as the cost of fuel to run the ship and provisions for
those on board during the idle days. If a ship that has picked up refugees at
126 UNCLOS Parties, supra note 17.
127 Status of IMO Conventions, supra note 9.28 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, 183 C.L.R. 273, 286-88 (Mason, C.J. &
Deane, J.), 298 (Toohey, J.), 315 (McHugh, J.) (1995), and authorities there cited.
129 Navigation Act, 1912, § 317A (Austl.).
130 White, supra note 4, at 10; Michael White, The TAMPA and the Law, SEAWAYS, THE
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE NAUTICAL INSTIUTE 5, 6 (Oct. 2001).
131 Navigation Act. 1912, § 3 16(1) (Austl.). This sub-section provides the scope of application of the
Division of the Act (Part VII, Div. 3) in which section 317A appears.
132 The Navigation Act 1912 gives the force of law to the Salvage Convention 1989, supra note 21,
but not art. 10, which contains the duty to render assistance. Navigation Act 1912, § 315. Section 315
appears in the same Division as §317A. Section 316(1), see Navigation Act 1912, § 315 and
accompanying text repeats the language of the Salvage Convention, supra note 21, art. 2.
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sea has to divert to an unscheduled port of call, it will also have to pay extra
nort charpes. ,Secondly, and more significantly in commercial terms, there is
the implicit cost of the lost time itself. The old clich6 is very true in relation
to ships: time is money. The daily time charter hire for a large container
ship such as the Tampa133 is about USD 20,000 per day, depending on
market conditions.' 34  Someone must bear the loss for every day the ship is
delayed. Although insurance will cover direct expenses such as fuel and
provisions, it will not cover the indirect costs from the lost time. Exactly
who bears that loss depends on the nature of the contractual arrangements
with the ship's operators.
Most commercial ocean-going ships are operated under time
charterparties. A time charterparty is a contract by which a shipowner
agrees to provide the services of its ship and crew to the time charterer, who
directs where the ship will go, what cargoes it will carry, and who earns
freight for carrying those cargoes.' 35  The charterparty is, in essence, an
133 The Tampa has a carrying capacity of 2455 standard-sized shipping containers (known as TEUs,
or twenty-foot equivalent units) and can carry a maximum of 44,013 metric tonnes of cargo (known as the
deadweight capacity). See Ship details at BRS-Alphaliner, http://www.alphaliner.com/brs-
alpha/search.htrn (last modified Aug. 9, 2002). The Tampa is presently a combined container/ro-ro ship,
meaning that it can carry both containers in fixed bays and also roll-on, roll-off cargo on trucks. Wallenius
Wilhelmsen Fleet List,
http://www.2wglobal.com/Global/4lModemVes/OlOurVessels/31ROROCONT/31ROROCONT.jsp (last
visited Aug. 9, 2002).
114 Market information can be difficult to obtain. Howe Robinson & Co. Ltd, a large London-based
containership shipbroker, maintains the Howe Robinson Containership Index, which measures fluctuations
in containership time charter hire. In the first quarter of 2000, daily time charter hire for a sample
containership of 35,000 deadweight tonnes and 2900 TEUs ranged from USD 18,000 per day to USD
21,500 per day. Howe Robinson Shipbrokers Container Charter Market Quarterly Review January-March
2000, at http://www.shipbroking.com/reports/fsreports.htn (last visited Aug. 9, 2002). Because the
Tampa carries ro-ro cargo as well as containers (see supra note 133) its total deadweight capacity is greater
than the Howe Robinson sample ship, even though its TEU capacity is slightly smaller. Thus, its daily time
charter hire would probably be higher than the Howe Robinson sample.
135 For example, in Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. v. Gesuri Chartering Co. Ltd., the court
states:
A time charter-party ... is a contract by which the shipowner agrees with the time
charterer that during a certain named period he will render services by his servants and
crew to carry the goods which are put on board his ship by the time charterer. It is for the
time charterer to decide, within the terms of the charterparty, what use he will make of
the vessel.
Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. v. Gesuri Chartering Co. Ltd. (Peonia) [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 100, 106-
107 (Bingham, L.J.) (Eng. C.A. 1991). Although the time charterer may wish to carry its own cargo on the
ship, it is much more common for it to engage in the business of carrying others' goods by sea. Kuwait
Maritime Transport Co. v. Rickmers Liie K.G., (The "Danah"), [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 351, 353 (Q.B.
(Com. Ct.) 1992). Although "freight" is often used to describe the goods themselves, in shipping practice it
means the compensation paid to a carrier for transporting goods. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (7th ed.
1999).
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agreement to divide responsibility for the navigational and commercial
operations of the chartered ship. 136 The shipowner remains responsible for
the navigational operation of the ship without concern for finding
employment for it.' 37 It sells to the charterer the right to make profits by
charging others for the carriage of goods on the ship and in return, it receives
a guaranteed flat rate of payment (known as hire) for use of the ship. 38 By
doing this, the shipowner avoids the fluctuating market demand for the
ship's services and can focus on the task for which it is better suited, sailing
the ship from port to port. Its profits lie in its ability to run the ship for less
than it receives from the charterer by way of hire. The time charterer, on the
other hand, takes responsibility for the commercial operation of the ship.
Because it has to pay the shipowner the agreed rate of hire each month, it
must find at least that rate by way of freight payments from cargo owners or
sub-charterers. It generates profit by moving more cargo freight than it must
pay for monthly hire. The time charterer can focus on the fluctuations of
market demand for the ship's services without concern for the essentially
different task of sailing the ship from port to port. 139
The commercial consequences of delay are allocated either to
shipowner or charterer by the terms of the charterparty. Time charterparties
invariably contain a clause, known as the "off-hire clause," which identifies
the circumstances in which the charterer's obligation to pay hire for use of
the ship shall be suspended. 140 If the ship goes off hire by operation of this
clause, the commercial cost of the delay is borne by the shipowner, who
ceases to receive hire payments from the charterer; if the ship remains on
hire, the commercial cost of the delay is borne by the charterer, who must
continue to pay hire despite the fact that the ship has been delayed. ' 4'
136 Martin Davies, In Defense of Unpopular Virtues: Personification and Ratification, 75 TUL. L.
REv. 337, 374-75 (2000).137 In practice, there is often a further division between ownership functions and those of nautical and
technical operation. LARS GORTON ET AL., SHIPBROKING AND CHARTERING PRACTICE, 85 (4th ed. 1995).
This is usually effected by means of a demise or bareboat charter, which assigns nautical and technical
operation to the demise charterer and ownership to the owner. For most purposes concerned with the
operation of the ship, a demise or bareboat charterer is then treated as the owner, and is generally called
ownerpro hac vice. Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 412 (1963), quoting Leary v. United States, 81 U.S.
607, 610 (1872), United States v. Shea, 152 U.S. 178 (1894).
138 For details about propositions in this paragraph, see GORTON ET AL., supra note 137, at 18-19, 84-
86, 90-92, 94-96.
139 The charterer does, however, normally have to pay running costs such as fuel (known as bunkers)
and pilotage and agency fees. See MICHAEL WILFORD ET AL., TIME CHARTERS 217-26 (4th ed. 1995).
140 LARS GORTON ET AL., SHIPBROKING AND CHARTERING PRACTICE 275-282 (5th ed. 1999).
141 Id
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A typical example of an off-hire clause is Clause 15 of the New York
Produce Exchange standard form time charterarty (NYPE): 
142
[I]n the event of loss of time from deficiency and/or default of
men or deficiency of stores, fire, breakdown or damages to hull,
machinery or equipment, grounding, detention by average
accidents to ship or cargo, dry-docking for the purpose of
examination or painting, or by any other cause preventing the
full working of the vessel, the payment of hire and overtime
shall cease for the time thereby lost.
143
For example, if the ship breaks down, it goes off hire, and the charterer's
obligation to pay for its use is suspended until the ship is able to perform
charterer's work again.1 4
As a result, if a time-chartered ship is delayed as a result of rescuing
refugees or asylum seekers in distress at sea, the question of who bears the
cost of that delay is answered by determining whether the ship goes off-hire
while the refugees or asylum seekers are on board. In C.A. Venezolana de
Navegacion v. Bank Line Ltd (Roachbank),145 a time-chartered ship,
Roachbank, came across a boatload of Vietnamese refugees in the South
China Sea. The refugees were in "a pitiful condition"' 146 and their boat was
sinking, so Roachbank stopped to take them on board. At the next port of
call, Kao-hsiung in Taiwan, the port authority initially refused to allow the
ship to enter port because of the presence of the refugees. The ship
remained anchored off the port for over a week. Finally, the port authority
relented and allowed Roachbank to enter port, but only after its owner had
secured a bank guarantee for an undertaking that all the refugees would
142 In practice, time charter-party contracts are usually made by modifying one of a few widely-used
standard forms. The New York Produce Exchange form is the most widely used. See WILFORD ET AL.,
supra note 139, for an extended series of annotations to the clauses of the New York Produce Exchange
standard form.
' New York Product Exchange Form (1946), reprinted in 2B BENEDICT, supra note 3, at 7-76.11.
See generally Martin Davies, The Off-Hire Clause in the New York Produce Exchange Time Charterparty,
1 LLoYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 107 (1990).
144 See, e.g., Hogarth v. Miller, 1891 A.C. 48 (appeal taken from Scotland). The ship goes on-hire
when it can work again, whether or not repairs have been completed. Id. (A ship off-hire on breakdown
was towed to port and began to discharge cargo before repairs completed. The court held that it was on-
hire from commencement of discharge.).
:" [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 337 (Eng. C.A.).
146 C.A. Venezolana de Navegacion v. Bank Line Ltd. (Roachbank), [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 498, 499
(Webster, J.) (Q.B.), aff'd [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 337 (Eng. C.A.).
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remain on the ship throughout its time in Kao-hsiung and that they would all
leave the port with the ship.1
47
The time charterer claimed that Roachbank was off-hire for the period
of the delay under Clause 15 of NYPE because the presence of the refugees
was a "cause preventing the full working of the vessel.' 48  The trial judge
rejected that argument, holding that Roachbank remained fully efficient and
capable in itself of performing the service required by the charterers; the
delay had been caused by something other than the condition of the ship.
The decision that the ship remained on-hire was affirmed by the English
Court of Appeal. 149  Thus, the charterer bore the cost of the master's
decision to pick up the refugees.
That will not necessarily be the result in all cases. Time charterparties
are not contracts of adhesion; they are freely negotiated between parties of
equal bargaining power, 150 and it is quite possible for a charterer to bargain
that the presence of refugees puts the ship off-hire if that is what it wants, 15'
although it may have to pay a little more by way of hire in retum. However,
it is most important in this context to understand that whether the cost of
delay is allocated by the off-hire clause to the shipowner or to the charterer,
it is borne by that party itself and not by its insurers.
Commercial ships carry two different kinds of insurance with two
very different kinds of insurers. 52 Hull and machinery insurance covers the
"' Id at 499-500.
148 New York Product Exchange Form (1946), cl. 15, reprinted in 2B BENEDICT, supra note 3.
149 Strictly speaking, the Court of Appeal refused the charterers special leave to appeal. Roachbank,
[1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 337, 343 (Eng. C.A.). Special leave was necessary because the matter had come
before Webster, J. as a case stated by arbitrators. Id. at 338.
"0 In Fed. Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Tradax Exp. S.A., the court states:
The freight market for chartered vessels still remains a classic example of a free
market. It is world-wide in coverage, highly competitive and sensitive to fluctuations in
supply and demand. It is a market in which the individual charterers and shipowners are
matched in bargaining power and are at liberty to enter into charterparties in whatever
contractual terms they please.
Fed. Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd v. Tradax Exp. S.A., 1978 A.C. stet. 1, 7 (Lord Diplock)
(appeal taken from Eng.).
15 See, e.g., Whistler Int'l Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (Hill Harmony), [1998] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 367, 370 (Clarke, J.) (Q.B. 1987), rev'd [2001] 1 A. C. 638 (appeal taken from Eng.) ("In the event of
loss of time either in port or at sea, deviation from the course of the voyage or putting back whilst on
voyage, caused by... refugees... the hire shall be suspended. ). The case itself was not concerned
with rescuing refugees.
152 See Raymond P. Hayden & Sanford E. Balick, Marine Insurance: Varieties, Combinations, and
Coverages, 66 TUL. L. REv. 311, 314 (1991); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW,
921 (3d ed. 2001). These sources describe the three main types of modem marine insurance cover: hull,
cargo and protection, and indemnity ("P&I"). Cargo insurance is not relevant to the issue under
consideration here.
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ship against the risk of damage or loss; it is usually placed with commercialinsurance companies or at Tlo's of Lno153 -LbAiity risks are insured
ot~~~ at .y a uU5-odo. Liabiiyr
with Protection and Indemnity Associations (usually called P & I Clubs),
which are mutual self-insurance associations of shipowners that operate on a
non-profit basis. 154  Nineteen P & I Clubs form the International Group;
between them, those nineteen clubs insure over 90 percent of the world's
ocean-going tonnage.155
The standard P & I Club cover indemnifies the member against any
direct expenses incurred as a result of picking up those in need of assistance
at sea, but it does not provide indemnity against the implicit cost of delay
itself. The Rules1 56 of the U.K. P & I Club (the world's largest) 157 are
typical. Rule 2, Section 7 of the U.K. Club Rules provides cover against:
Expenses of diversion of an entered ship where and to the
extent that those expenses (i) represent the net loss to the
Owner (over and above such expenses as would have been
incurred but for the diversion) in respect of the cost of fuel,
insurance, wages, stores, provisions and port charges and (ii)
are incurred solely for the purpose of securing treatment for an
injured or sick person or while awaiting a substitute for such
153 Hayden & Balick, supra note 152, at 314-19.
14 Id. at 325-26; see also Norman J. Ronneberg, Jr., An Introduction to the Protection & Indemnity
Clubs and the Marine Insurance They Provide, 3 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1991). See also Psarianos v.
Standard Marine Ltd., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 438, 451 (E.D. Tex. 1989) ("[A] protection and indemnity
association is not a traditional insurance company; it is a group of shipowners who have agreed to insure
one another's vessels for the mutual benefit of all"). Strictly speaking, P&I Clubs do not provide liability
insurance because of their "pay to be paid" rules, which require members to pay a claim before they are
entitled to indemnity from the Club pool. Ronneberg, supra note 154, at 5-6. See also Firma C-Trade,
S.A. v. Newcastle Prot. & Indem. Assoc. (Fanti and Padre Island, No. 2), [1991] 2 A.C. stet. 1, 28 (Lord
Brandon of Oakbrook) (appeal taken from Eng.) (incurring liability gives member only a contingent right
against the club because it is "a condition precedent to the members being indemnified by the clubs in
respect of those liabilities that they should first have been discharged by the members themselves.").
155 See U.K. P. & I. Club, About P. & I.: The International Group of P. & I. Clubs, available at
http://www.ukpandi.com/ukpandi/2about.html#Intemational (last visited August 8, 2002). Although they
compete with one another for business, the nineteen Clubs in the International Group pool their larger risks
by agreement, and buy reinsurance for the group as a whole for claims exceeding the pool agreement. The
combined effect of the pooling and reinsurance arrangements is that the clubs in the group are covered up
to USD 2.03 billion per claim (USD I billion in the case of oil pollution claims). Id.
116 The contract of insurance between the member and the Club, and between the members
themselves, is in the terms of the Club rules. See Firma C-Trade, S.A. v. Newcastle Prot. Indem. Assoc.
(Fanti and Padre Island, No. 2), [1991] 2 A.C. stet. 1, 23 (Lord Brandon of Oakbrook) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
157 U.K. P. & I. Club, General Introduction to the U.K. P. & I. Club, available at
http://www.ukpandi.con/2about.html#club (last visited August 8, 2002). The U.K. P. & I. Club insures
well over 100 million tonnes of owned and chartered ships, more than one-fifth of the world total. Id.
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person or for the purpose of landing stowaways or refugees, or
for the purpose of saving life at sea.1
58
The Club Rules of Assuranceforeningen Gard, the Norwegian-based P. & I.
Club in which the Tampa was (and is) entered, 159 are even more explicit.
Rule 32 provides:
The Association shall cover costs and expenses directly and
reasonably incurred in consequence of the Ship having
stowaways, refugees or persons saved at sea on board, but only
to the extent that the Member is legally liable for the costs and
expenses or they are incurred with the approval of the
Association. The cover does not include consequential loss of
profit or depreciation.'60
Following a description of the Tampa incident in Gard News, the
Gard Club's newsletter, there is a description of the Club's cover for
expenses incurred in saving life at sea, which says: "It must be noted that
the cover under the P & Ipolicy does not include the financial loss to the
member due to the delay.
Thus, if a ship is delayed as a result of doing as it should, stopping to
aid persons in need of assistance at sea, the implicit cost of the delay is
absorbed by the ship's operator, either the owner or time charterer (if there is
one). The powerful commercial disincentive to assist potential refugees is
made more powerful if nearby countries with potential places of refuge are
reluctant to allow the ship to land the refugees, as they were in the
Roachbank case and the Tampa Incident. The resulting additional delay
directly affects the ship operator's financial position and can rapidly run into
hundreds of thousands of dollars.
" U.K. P. & I. Club, Rules and By-Laws 2002, Rule 2, Section 7, available at
http://www.ukpandi.com/Rules2002/Rules_02.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
159 Gard P. & I List of Vessels 2002, 76 (2002), available at
http://www.gard.no/Publish/ListOfVessels/ListOfVessels.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
160 Assuranceforeningen Gard, Statutes and Rules 2002, Rule 32,
http://www.gard.no/Publications/statutesandrules/rues/p2_chapterl.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2002). The
rules of Assuranceforeningen Skuld, another Norwegian Club, are even clearer. Assuranceforeningen
Skuld, Statutes and Rules 2002, Rule 11, http://www.skuld.com/intro/statutesrules/artikkel.asp?id=684 (last
visited Aug. 23, 2002). The Skuld rules provide cover for extra costs incurred in assisting in the rescue of
persons at sea, but exclude costs "which are incurred in respect of... the loss of freight or hire for the
entered vessel" Id at Rule 11.2.2(a).
161 Gard's Cover for Expenses Incurred in Saving Life at Sea, 165 GARD NEWS, Feb.-Apr. 2002, at 9,
www.gard.no/Publications/GardNews/Recentlssues/gn165/art_3.asp (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
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V. CONCLUSION
The problem identified in this Article cannot be remedied by
amendment to existing international legal norms. The existing treaty
provisions state the obligation to assist broadly enough, and they have been
widely adopted. No amendment to strengthen them would have any
appreciable impact on the plight of those in need of assistance at sea. The
problem is one of ineffective enforcement, which is largely a product of the
prevalence of flags of convenience states. The IMO has long made a
concerted effort to improve the safety record of all ships, particularly those
registered under flags of convenience, but that effort understandably focuses
on the safety of the ships themselves.
162
A large part of the solution to ineffective flag state control has been an
increase in port state control-that is, oversight by coastal state authorities
of seaworthiness and compliance with international ship safety obligations
when foreign-flagged ships visit port.' 63 However, neither port state control
nor enhanced flag state enforcement of international safety requirements will
help those in distress at sea, despite the fact that the principal safety
convention, SOLAS, contains an obligation to assist.
The insurance arrangements on commercial ships are such that
enforcement of seaworthiness and safety requirements can effectively be
delegated to independent third parties, namely classification societies.'
64
162 See Heike Hoppe, THE WORK OF THE SUB-COMMIIIEE ON FLAG STATE IMPLEMENTATION - AN
OVERVIEW (2000), at http://www.imo.org/InfoResource/mainframe.asp?topicid=406&docid=1080 (last
visited Aug. 19, 2002).
161 See, John Hare, Port State Control: Strong Medicine to Cure a Sick Industry, 26 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 571 (1997); Ademuni Odeke, Port State Control and U.K. Law, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 657
(1997); Z. OvA OZCAYIR, PORT STATE CONTROL (2001).
164 Hannu Honka, The Classification System and Its Problems With Special Reference to the Liability
of Classification Societies, 19 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 4 (1994) ("Governments regulate seaworthiness to protect
the public interest. However, most governments have delegated their supervisory powers to classification
societies."). Classification societies such as Lloyd's Register of Shipping and the American Bureau of
Shipping act as neutral third parties, undertaking ship surveys to provide seaworthiness and safety
information, principally to insurers. Masataka Hidaka, The Role of Class in Meeting the Safety Challenge,
available at http://www.iacs.org.uk/seatrade.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2002). All P & I Clubs make it a
condition of entry that the ship be maintained in class with an approved classification society, often a
member of the International Association of Classification Societies (I.A.C.S.). See, e.g.,
Assuranceforeningen Gard, Statutes and Rules 2002, supra note 160, at Rule 8(l)(a) ("It shall be a
condition of the insurance of the Ship that ... the Ship shall be and remain throughout the period of entry
classed with a classification society approved by the Association."). Similarly, hull insurance policies
typically require the shipowner to keep the ship in class through the life of the policy. See, e.g., Institute
Time Clauses (Hulls), cl. 4.1.1 reprinted in N. GEOFFREY HUDSON & J.C. ALLEN, THE INSTITUTE CLAUSES
95-96 (3d ed. 1999) ("It is the duty of the Assured... at the inception of and throughout the period of this
insurance to ensure that ... the vessel is classed with a Classification Society agreed by the underwriters
and that her class within that Society is maintained.").
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Enforcing compliance with the obligation to assist cannot be delegated in the
same way: it falls squarely on the shoulders of the flag state itself or, within
the territory covered by the SAR Convention, 65 the coastal state. As noted
above, many flag-of-convenience states either have no functioning legal
system at all, or no resources available to engage in extra-territorial
enforcement of their laws.
It is difficult to hide the sub-standard condition of a ship from port
state control authorities, but sadly it is easy to hide a failure to pick up
persons in need of distress at sea,' 66 if the complicity of the crew can be
maintained 167 and if coastal state search and rescue services have not spotted
those in distress and traced the ship's proximity to them. The expansion and
strengthening of the SAR Convention that occurred in 2000 provides
perhaps the best prospect of more effective enforcement.' 68 As noted above,
if a coastal state that is party to the SAR Convention were to direct a
commercial ship to provide assistance to persons in distress at sea, that
country would probably be entitled to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the
master if he or she refused to comply, regardless of whether the ship was on
innocent passage at the time. 169  The high seas cover a very large area,
though, and it is likely that many small boats carrying refugees and asylum
seekers will remain undetected except by commercial ships.
A commercial ship encountering persons in distress at sea provides a
weak legal incentive to assist, coupled with a powerful commercial
disincentive from doing so (and, of course, a strong moral obligation to do
so). The longer the delay to the ship as a result of rescuing those in distress,
the less likely it is to do as it should. To put it bluntly, government
reluctance to allow rescued refugees to be placed ashore, such as that shown
by Australia in the Tampa Incident, is likely to cause more refugees to die at
sea.
165 SAR Convention, supra note 90.
:66 See Of Dogs, Fish and Men, supra note 5.
67 Compare Sangeorzan v. Yangming Marine Transp. Corp., 951 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(Romanian stowaways died after being thrown overboard following their discovery on Taiwanese ship; and
the surviving family members sued shipowner relying on evidence of crew members as witnesses.)
168 The SAR Convention was amended on May 18, 1998 by resolution of the IMO's Maritime Safety
Committee (Res. MSC.70(69)) with effect from January 1, 2000. See SAR Convention, supra note 90.
The amendments place increased emphasis on regional cooperation and co-ordination between member
countries. See International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979, The 1998 Amendments,
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=653&topic-id=257#6 (last visited August 19, 2002).
169 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.

